DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS' PROFESSIONAL
SITUATION AND THE *DE THUCYDIDE*

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NINO LURAGHI HAS RECENTLY REOPENED THE QUESTION of the intended audience of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae*.[1] Alongside the various indications in the text that suggest that the intended audience was primarily Greek, he points to other passages that envisage reception by a readership among the Roman elite, and these, he argues, more accurately indicate the primary audience for Dionysius' work. The passages in the first category, which apparently orient the *Antiquitates Romanae* towards a Greek readership, are merely cover, designed to make the work acceptable to Romans who would only be prepared to tolerate a Greek historian lecturing them on their own early history if he adopted the pose of a Greek writing for Greeks. Dionysius' extreme Aeolism might make his history especially problematic for Roman readers, for whenever he suggested that contemporary Romans needed to recover the lost virtues of their ancestors, he was in effect implying that they needed to get more in touch with their inner Greek.

Luraghi is perhaps too quick to frame the question as a matter either of a primarily Roman or a primarily Greek audience and to reject the possibility that the *Antiquitates Romanae* were aimed more broadly at a Greek-literate readership, both Greek and Roman, with particular strategies adopted at different points in the work to appeal to particular segments within that readership.[2] Nonetheless his main point is unquestionably correct: Roman sensitivities must have posed a challenge for a Greek writing Roman history.

I hope here to show that this challenge does not only face Dionysius when he writes as a historian. We can see similar concerns in one of his treatises on Greek literature, the *De Thucydide*, even though one might imagine that Dionysius the Greek rhetor would have enjoyed much greater authority than Dionysius the early Roman historian. Therefore (and this is my study's second major argument), we should consider Dionysius' need to accommodate his writing

[1] See Luraghi 2003; cf. Bowersock 1965: 131; *contra* Gabba 1991: 79–80 and n. 27.
[2] So Schultze 1986: 133–141; Fromentin and Schnäbele 1990: 4; Hidber, 1996: 78, n. 325; Fromentin 1998: xxxv–xxxvii; Fromentin 2001: 125.

to Roman sensibilities in broader terms than a need to defer to their sense of ownership of their early history, although that should remain central.

Dionysius was an outsider seeking to make a career for himself in a foreign society, a position of systematic insecurity but one which also offered potential rewards. For if it is true that "for the Romans, Greek culture, like the Greek population and Greek material wealth, was a colonial resource to be exploited and appropriated" (Habinek 1998: 34), it is also true that such exploitation and appropriation could not be carried out without the involvement of actual Greeks. To succeed in Rome, Greek literary experts had to adapt their authorizing role as arbiters of literary taste to new demands, but that authorizing role was more important than ever. As Whitmarsh (2001: 9–17) acutely points out, the equation of being Greek with being *pepaideumenos* assumed new significance in the Roman context. In looking at changes—or rather seeming changes—in Dionysius' views on Thucydides, we can observe one such immigrant Greek intellectual displaying his cultural authority from a position of dependence on the Roman elite.

Dionysius' remarks about Thucydides are mainly to be found in two of his works. In the *Epistula ad Pompeium* Dionysius reproduces a discussion of historians from his lost *De imitatione*; Thucydides is discussed at *Pomp.* 3. A second, more extensive, treatment comprises Dionysius' *De Thucydide*. The relative chronology of the *Ad Pompeium* and *De Thucydide* is uncertain, but the *De imitatione* is earlier than the *De Thucydide* (*Thuc.* 1).[3] Sacks (1983: 66–80) argues that what purports to be a quotation from the *De imitatione* in the *Ad Pompeium* has been subject to extensive revision, but his case is unsound, as Heath (1989a) has shown. I adopt here the view that the *Ad Pompeium* gives us a *verbatim* quotation from the earlier work, as long as we allow for the presence of lacunae in the transmitted text.[4] But my argument would not be seriously affected if the extract from the *De imitatione* were drawn from a work in progress which was subject to minor revision before final publication (so Usener 1889; Heath 1989a).

While still critical, Dionysius views Thucydides more positively in the *De Thucydide* than in the *Ad Pompeium* (i.e., the *De imitatione*). This inconsistency is not especially true of the treatises' similar assessment of Thucydides' style (e.g., *Thuc.* 24; *Pomp.* 3.15). But Dionysius' view of Thucydides' handling of historical content (*pragmatikoi topoi*)[5] appears to change. From a uniformly hostile judgment in the *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione*, Dionysius apparently arrives in the *De Thucydide* at a more balanced verdict that mixes praise and criticism. Scholars

[3] The overall relative chronology of Dionysius' works is a difficult and probably insoluble question. For different schemes see Bonner 1939: 25–38 (cf. Sacks 1989: 83–87); Costil 1949: part 3 (this unpublished thesis has no consistent page numbers; Costil's scheme is accepted by Aujac 1991); best perhaps is the cautious view of Usher (1974: xxvi) and Hidber (1996: 10–11), who categorize the treatises in three broad groups of "early," "middle," and "late." The *De imitatione* is early, the *De Thucydide* late; the *Ad Pompeium* may be either middle or late.

[4] So Weaire 2002; cf. Costil 1949: part 4, chapter 5.

[5] For the historiographical *pragmatikoi topoi*, see, in general, Bonner 1939: 40–41, 84.

have often taken this to be positive development in Dionysius' thought.[6] Perhaps it has been hard to resist the idea of a critic who, as he matured, adopted views on Thucydides as a historian (as distinct from a stylist) that more closely resembled our own.

But Dionysius may not have been so free to engage in autonomous debate with intellectual predecessors, contemporaries, and his own earlier views. The addressee of the *De Thucydide* was a Roman of great social and intellectual importance: Q. Aelius Tubero, the jurist and historian. He is, in fact, the most socially prominent figure with whom Dionysius is known to have interacted.[7] That Dionysius must have been inferior and marginal in comparison is obvious. However, the exact relationship between these two individuals is unknown. It is tempting to assign Tubero a key role in Dionysius' social and intellectual world. Bowersock, for instance, speaks comfortably of Tubero's "patronage" of Dionysius and sees Tubero as a crucial influence.[8] However, we cannot be sure that their relationship was patronal in nature (except that the two are obviously not social equals). In particular, we do not know that there was sustained contact between Tubero and Dionysius, since the *De Thucydide* and the reference to the *De Thucydide* at *Ad Ammaeum* 2.1 are our only evidence for contact at all.[9]

Rather, we should concentrate on Dionysius' dependence on the Roman elite in general. Greek immigrant scholars were in a more precarious situation than the Augustan poets whose social position has been subjected to exhaustive examination. The poets, by and large, were of comparatively high status and financially independent. White (1993: 5–20) has explored the rewards that such respectable individuals might seek to obtain from contact with Romans of still

[6] Especially true of older scholarship: for example, Bonner 1939; Grube 1950 (but cf. more recently Heath 1989b: 74–89). Pritchett (1975: xxii–xxvi) has an amusing collection of verdicts on Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides (cf. Hidber 1996: vii–viii). Not all have agreed: Sacks (1983) sees the *Ad Pompeium* as the later and more mature work (but his argument depends on his implausible hypothesis of extensive revision), while Fox (1996: 63–67) plays down the difference between the two works without addressing the specific divergences systematically.

[7] That the addressee of the *De Thucydide* is the same Q. Aelius Tubero as the historian is now generally accepted: see Pritchett 1975: 47; Bowersock 1965: 130; Schultze 1986: 122–123; Hidber 1996: 6. The addressee of *De imitatione* was a Greek named Demetrius (not otherwise attested), that of *Ad Pompeium* was Cn. Pompeius Geminus (also otherwise unknown). He may have been a Greek scholar with Roman citizenship and, if so, probably a freedman (so, e.g., Bowersock 1965: 129–130; Schultze 1986: 122; for attempts to identify Pompeius with the author of the *De sublimitate*, see Goold 1961: 172–174); but Geminus may have been a Roman (see Hidber [1996: 7], who prefers to leave the question open).

[8] Bowersock 1965: 130; Bowersock 1979: *passim*, esp. 67–68; cf. Schultze 1986: 122–123; Fromentin 1998: xiv–xvii. I prefer to confine the term "patronage" to relationships between (socially unequal) individuals that are both personal and continuing (so esp. the influential definition of Saller [1982: 1]; Gold [1987: 40] defines the term more broadly).

[9] For criticism of Bowersock's excessively prosopographical argument, see Swain 1996: 78 and Wisse 1995: 78. The first reference to Tubero at *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.3 is extremely casual and hardly suggests a close relationship.

higher status: gifts of very high value and enhancement of prestige across elite Roman society. This is not to say that immigrant Greek intellectuals might never hope for equivalent rewards, but in their case more modest needs should be given their due: financial security, resources for research, and status among their peers. That we must talk of "needs" rather than "rewards" is a crucial difference between Dionysius and the poets.

Greek expatriates were often economically dependent on the Roman aristocracy for their livelihood through teaching. Whether or not Dionysius in particular ran anything that could be called a "school," as Bonner (1939: 2) thinks, he certainly taught at least one son of the Roman elite (*Comp.* 20). Dionysius never explicitly states that he does this for a fee, and Schultze (1986: 123–124) has sought to downplay the importance of his teaching. But while Schultze makes the fair point that Dionysius taught "at a fairly high level" to accomplished students, it is not clear that Dionysius did so solely "as a favour." An argument from silence here lacks force. Literary (i.e., social) convention would have dictated that any profit motive be concealed in the *De compositione verborum*[10]—even if there had been occasion to mention fees, which there is not.

What information we can glean about Dionysius' teaching practice suggests that his status in the profession was not particularly high. He advertises his willingness to listen to a student do his exercises (*Comp.* 20). Two contemporaries, Nicetes (a fellow Greek) and M. Porcius Latro, were too grand to do this and confined themselves to declaiming as a model for students to imitate (Sen. *Controv.* 9.2.23). Both Nicetes and Latro charged fees for their teaching and both appear to have been more prominent than Dionysius.[11] *A fortiori*, this suggests that taking fees would not have been beneath his dignity.

A separate consideration is that Dionysius' project of writing a history of early Rome depended on the goodwill of powerful Romans of an intellectual bent, the "highly erudite men" (λογιωτάτων ἀνδρῶν), referred to at *Ant. Rom.* 1.7.3.[12] He would have needed these knowledgeable Roman contacts for more than just the insight into Roman matters which he boasts of having derived from them (although that would indeed have been vital). They could provide access to the many Latin historical works which he used.[13] Pillaging of eastern libraries had resulted in the transfer to Italy of many Greek texts as well that Dionysius

[10] See Gold 1987: 65; Habinek 1998: 106; cf. Habinek 1998: 108–109 on the desirability of financially dependent teachers. Hidber (1995: 2–4) discusses the economic devastation of the Greek east by warfare as a factor driving scholars like Dionysius to Rome; cf. Rawson 1985: 7–18; Swain 1996: 2–3. Teaching is a crucial part of this picture: cf. Fromentin 1998: xiv.

[11] Seneca's words imply payment: *hoc erat non patientiam suam sed eloquentiam vendere.* Nicetes' lofty status among contemporary Greek rhetors is indicated by Jerome (*Chron.* 162 Helm). For Latro's prominence, see Quint. 10.5.18 and Plin. *HN* 20.160; he was included in Suet. *Rhet.* (fr 2). On his career, see, in general, Kaster 1995: 329–331.

[12] Cf. the description of Tubero and other readers/evaluators of the *De Thucydide* as φιλόλογοι (*Thuc.* 2, 25); also cf. *Orat. Vett.* 3.

[13] On Dionysius' sources, see Gabba 1991: 85–90, 97–98, 118, n. 54, 162–166, 185–186.

would have needed as sources.[14]   Both Greek and Latin texts were as a rule only to be found in private libraries under the control of individual Roman aristocrats.[15]

Students and books were limited resources outside Dionysius' control, in the hands of the Roman elite. To gain access to them required practical intelligence and connections to leading Romans (but not necessarily substantial and continuous "patronal" connections, and not necessarily direct connections). Such social capital must have entirely taken the place occupied for Dionysius' modern academic equivalents by institutional support.[16]   The challenge of acquiring this social capital should not be underestimated. If Greek scholars derived income from teaching, then the demands on their time would have made it difficult for them to integrate themselves into the rhythms of aristocratic *otium* in the way that was characteristic of the poets' involvement with the lives of the great.[17] The status of educators in the Augustan period was higher than in the age of Cicero, but they had yet to attain the heights reached by the second century A.D. (see Kaster 1995: xxvii–xxix).

A sharp Greek expatriate scholar would therefore learn to make the most of even marginal contacts with elite society. It is likely that brokerage could help to raise one's status, not relative to the Roman elite, but rather to other Greek *literati*. Even if Dionysius was not dependent upon teaching, others were, and books of no value to him might be of vital interest for the work of others. Such immigrant Greek scholars came to Rome in greater numbers in this period, and this will have increased both the competition for access and its rewards (even if a gradual increase of status for such educators as a whole will have acted as a countervailing force).[18]

We may thus conceive of Dionysius' professional situation in terms of a social network. Wisse has argued for viewing Dionysius' intellectual relations similarly in terms of a fluid intellectual network of "contacts of various sorts and intensities"

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[14] See Marshall 1976: 257–261 and Luraghi 2003: 269–270. Roman collections of Greek books could also offer employment to the immigrant scholar.

[15] For the largely private character of resources for research at Rome (despite the development of public collections, esp. the imperial libraries), see Marshall 1976 *passim*; Rawson 1985: 38–42.

[16] See Lin 2000 for a survey of recent work on social capital and its relationship to social inequality.

[17] See White 1993: 3–5. Elsewhere he notes (63) that the poets are averse to including Greek intellectuals among their *amici* (on the sterile question of the relationship between *amicitia* and patronage see, e.g., Saller 1989; White 1993: 27–34; Konstan 1995 and 1997: 135–145; and Bowditch 2001: 19–27). We may compare the opening gambit of the connection-seeking pest of Hor. *Sat.* 1.9: the claim to be *doctus* (7); only when that fails does he turn to other accomplishments (23–25; on this character, see Damon 1997: 121–125). Depictions in later sources of relative intimacy between Greek intellectuals and Roman aristocrats (e.g., the hostile Lucian *De merc. cond.*) are an unsafe guide to social relations in Dionysius' period; later Greek rhetors could achieve stardom in an entirely eastern milieu, and so were in a stronger position if they did come to Rome (see Swain 1996: 2–3).

[18] On the development of Rome as a major Greek intellectual center, see Bowersock 1965: 122–134; Rawson 1985: 3–18; Luraghi 2003: 269–270.

between individual Greeks and Roman intellectuals.[19] He warns not to take this as license to drag old ideas out of their grave. The "Scipionic circle" should not be resurrected as the "Scipionic network." No doubt the same would apply to the "literary" or "Greek professorial" circles at Rome once postulated for Dionysius and contemporaries like Caecilius of Caleacte by Rhys Roberts and Goold.[20]

One way to avoid that is to draw on observations about the properties of social networks that have been derived from their intensive study in modern contexts over the past few decades, especially in the area of how their exact structure leads to advantages and disadvantages for individuals (see Burt 1992: esp. 8–49). One useful case in point is that the weaker a social tie is, the more likely it is to offer useful access to social resources.[21] There is no need to suppose that a valuable relationship with Tubero must have been close.

Dionysius' pervasive dependence on the Roman elite means that we cannot assume that he would have done best if he relied on a strong relationship with a single "gatekeeper," one particular Roman aristocrat, to obtain access to and information about the resources of the Roman elite as a whole (which is the same as envisaging Tubero in a central role as patron).[22] A viable alternative would have been to divide his efforts among a large number of weaker relationships with different members of the Roman elite. Dionysius would not in this situation have been vulnerable to the risk of being totally cut off, and by spreading his net wide, he would maximize his contacts.

These two approaches are opposing ends of a spectrum rather than mutually exclusive. In reality, the numbers and strengths of relationships maintained by individual Greeks with Roman aristocrats must have been diverse. The more powerful a given Roman was (i.e., the degree to which he could provide access

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[19] Wisse 1995: 65–82, 78–79; cf. White 1993: 35–63 for a similar approach to the the Augustan poets. *Pomp.* 1 offers an instance of the intellectual brokerage envisaged by Wisse: the exchange of views between Dionysius and Geminus has been facilitated by their mutual friend Zenon.

[20] Rhys Roberts 1900; Goold 1961; cf. Bowersock 1965: 124–134; Battisti 1997: 9–10. Cf. White 1993: 36–40 on "circles" as an inadequate model for the poets.

[21] Due to homophily ("like likes like"), weak ties are less likely to duplicate existing social resources than strong ones. Thus one's close friends are much more likely to know one another than one's casual acquaintances and any one of them is unlikely to provide one with much useful information or many contacts that one could not have obtained from one of the others; but every casual acquaintance probably offers a unique set of contacts. See Burt 1992: 15–30; this widely influential "weak tie model" originates with Granovetter 1973.

[22] Even if Tubero was Dionysius' "patron," such relationships were not exclusive: see Brunt 1988: 398–400; Wallace-Hadrill 1989a: 78; and cf. Archias (Cic. *Arch.* 5–7, on which see Wiseman 1982: 31–34). On the importance of weak ties, cf. White 1993: 44–45: "At least the most successful poets must have outgrown an identification with any one grouping as they kept connecting with friends of friends and as they themselves came to be sought out by socialites with literary leanings .... Martial indicates unmistakably that the multiplication of friends leads to the weakening of attachment to anyone in particular." This is not a process in which cause and effect only flow in one direction; artistic success (i.e., recognition) may allow the acquisition of such wider and weaker social ties, but the reverse can also happen: see Giuffre 1999.

to the resources of Roman elite society as a whole), the more likely it is that it would have been sensible to invest heavily in a strong social tie with him. The relationship between Pompey and Theophanes of Mitylene (whose status appears to have been rather superior to Dionysius') may be an example of a strong social tie.[23] But it was probably important not to be rigidly committed to any one strategy and to be able to improvise new responses as circumstances changed. Social relations are dynamic in all times and places, of course, but Dionysius' Rome must have seen its own peculiar changes due to the increasing status and numbers of Greek educators.[24] Exactly how Dionysius approached the challenge is unknowable. But we do not need to worry about whether Tubero was Dionysius' patron or not. Their relationship can have fallen anywhere in a wide possible range, and it can still have been useful for Dionysius to display deference to Tubero's opinions.

It is not a new observation that such deference is audible in the diffident tone of the opening of the *De Thucydide*.[25] There, Dionysius highlights Tubero's dissatisfaction with Dionysius' earlier critical treatment of Thucydides in the *De imitatione* as the motive that has prompted the Roman to ask the Greek for further discussion (*Thuc.* 1). In response, Dionysius denies that the defects in the earlier discussion resulted from contempt for his predecessor and carelessness. This suggests that precisely those charges had been leveled against him, motivating him to "clarify" his position. His explanation for the *De imitatione*'s flaws is that there he offered only a summary treatment.

This opening is only the beginning of an unusually lengthy and defensive *captatio benevolentiae* (*Thuc.* 1–4), entirely directed at refuting the potential charge that Dionysius criticizes Thucydides unfairly. He obviously anticipates a hostile response from the reader to any such criticism. This defensiveness contrasts markedly with the bluntly negative *obiter dicta* of the *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione*, where Thucydides is far from the "greatest of historians" (as he is in *Thuc.* 2).

Concern that criticism of Thucydides might be badly received does not have to be the reason for every divergence between the *De Thucydide* and the *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione*. But it may be significant that most divergences relate directly or indirectly to one particular *pragmatikos topos*: *ethos*. In *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione*, Thucydides is malicious, animated by bitterness towards Athens due to his exile. He narrates Athenian errors in detail; her successes he either omits completely or includes as if under duress (*Pomp.* 3.15). *De Thucydide*, in contrast, is

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[23] See Gold 1987: 66–67 for the "new" patronage associated with powerful individuals; 87–107 for Pompey and Theophanes in particular.

[24] Probably to be connected with a general Augustan relocation of expert authority: see Wallace-Hadrill 1997: 11–22.

[25] Bonner 1939: 5; he draws a specific contrast with Dionysius' assertiveness in addressing Pompeius Geminus in the *Ad Pompeium* (as well as Dionysius' stance in *Ad Ammaeum* 1 and 2); Fox (1996: 66–67) also emphasizes the defensiveness of the *De Thucydide*.

lavishly complimentary. Thucydides was a careful and well-informed investigator (*Thuc.* 6) and a historian devoted to the truth, neither malicious nor a flatterer (*Thuc.* 8).

As proof, Dionysius adduces Thucydides' generous assessments of various specific Athenian leaders (*Thuc.* 8). He here evades his earlier argument. Favorable assessments of individuals are compatible with an unfairly hostile attitude towards the people of Athens as a whole. Note also the following related pair of evasions. Dionysius appears to praise Thucydides in *De Thucydide* for selecting a single war as his subject, because Thucydides thought that it was neither too meagre a topic to benefit the reader, nor too large for the reader to study closely (*Thuc.* 6). This general case for a *via media* avoids addressing the specific and *ethos*-related criticism of Thucydides' unpatriotic topic in *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione*: an unmitigated disaster for Greece (*Pomp.* 3.4). One evasion then forces another. *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione* criticizes Thucydides' failure to make enough use of digressions to refresh the reader (3.12). But there this monotony was a result of the concentration on a single war. In *De Thucydide* Dionysius no longer thinks that this was a bad idea. This is no doubt one reason why the equivalent section in *De Thucydide* (13–18) deals rather with Thucydides' selection of episodes for development. Also, Dionysius now makes much of the historian's principled rejection of fabulous material to deceive and to practice trickery upon the masses (*Thuc.* 6: εἰς ἀπάτην καὶ γοητείαν τῶν πολλῶν). Such fabulous material was of course typically diverting content for historical digressions (see Marincola 1997: 118).

Both works criticize Thucydides' starting-point. The *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione* attributes this to Thucydides' malice against his own city and country (*Pomp.* 3.9). The Corcyraean crisis was when things started to go badly for the Greeks; starting there enabled Thucydides to blame his own city for the disastrous war. He should instead have begun patriotically with the great deeds of Athens after the Persian War, instead of confining these to a delayed and miserly digression. The *De Thucydide*'s criticism is drier: Thucydides has violated technical rules of composition (*Thuc.* 10–11).[26] Dionysius suggests the same alternative beginning (and proceeds to assume this elsewhere; he objects to the short shrift given to the Battle of the River Eurymedon, which only makes sense in the context of a notional revised history covering the years 479–404 B.C. as a whole: *Thuc.* 13). But once again he evades the *ethos*-related specifics of the earlier argument. The alternative opening would have been vaguely "better" (κρείττων) and would have embraced important but not hackneyed events (*Thuc.* 11).

Dionysius is consistent in disliking the unfinished state of Thucydides' history (*Pomp.* 3.10; *Thuc.* 12). But only the *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione* specifies where the work should have ended. The omission relates to *ethos*, since the virtue

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[26] Dionysius attributes these rules to unnamed earlier critics; Aujac (1991: 150) plausibly suggests that this is in order not to annoy Tubero.

of the alternative ending (the return of the exiles from Phyle) is its patriotism (*Pomp.* 3.10). Finally, while both works object to the obscurity of a narrative organized by summers and winters (*Pomp.* 3.13–14; *Thuc.* 9–10), only in the *De Thucydide* is this flaw excused on the grounds that Thucydides thought that it would result in clarity (*Thuc.* 9). This addition coheres with the new version of Thucydides' *ethos*.

The element from his earlier views that Dionysius initially avoids most carefully is the charge that Thucydides was driven by an embittered hatred of Greece and Athens. But buried towards the end of the section on *pragmatikoi topoi* are two hints that Dionysius' estimation of Thucydides' *ethos* is unchanged. The first is the following (*Thuc.* 15):

... οὐκ ἔχω συμβαλεῖν κατὰ τί τὴν Λακωνικὴν προέκρινε τῆς Ἀττικῆς μᾶλλον, τὴν ὑστέραν τοῖς χρόνοις ἀντὶ τῆς προτέρας καὶ τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἰδίας καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἐλάττοσι κακοῖς γενομένην ἀντὶ τῆς ἐπὶ μείζοσι.

... I cannot conjecture why he decided in favor of the Spartan [embassy] rather than the Athenian, the later [embassy] in time rather than the earlier, *the [embassy] of strangers rather than that of his own people*, and the one sent because of lesser sufferings rather than the one sent because of greater.

The insinuation that Thucydides neglected the claims of his native Athens upon his affections is very reminiscent of the *Ad Pompeium/De imitatione*. The second hint comes when Dionysius criticizes the Archaeology as a factually incorrect slander upon the greatness of Greece (*Thuc.* 19). Here also the blunt criticism of the earlier work is recast as an insinuation.

Dionysius does eventually make the charge of malicious *ethos* explicit—but not until he has ostensibly left the *pragmatikoi topoi* behind and moved on to style. *De Thucydide* 37–41 is an extended critique of the Melian Dialogue, in which Dionysius repeatedly claims that the sentiments put into the Athenians' mouths characterize them unfairly (*Thuc.* 38–41 *passim*, esp. 39). At the end, Dionysius explains why he thinks Thucydides has portrayed his compatriots like this (*Thuc.* 41): εἰ μὴ ἄρα μνησικακῶν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τῇ πόλει διὰ τὴν καταδίκην ταῦτα τὰ ὀνείδη κατεσκέδασεν αὐτῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες μισήσειν αὐτὴν ἔμελλον ("Perhaps the historian had a grudge against his city because he had been condemned by her, and so spread these criticisms, criticisms which would cause everyone to hate her"). Thucydides is "malicious" once again: very different from the impartial investigator with whom Dionysius began the *De Thucydide*. The earlier impression of a change of heart (contrived mostly through evasion rather than outright recantation of earlier statements) was only a new spin on old views.

It is therefore not so much Thucydides' *ethos* that worries Dionysius as his own; he does not want to appear animated by malice against his predecessor. One particular element in Dionysius' self-presentation deserves notice here: the opening claims that Dionysius, like philosophers who have criticized their

predecessors, criticizes Thucydides only as a route to the truth (3). This appropriates for Dionysius a signature quality often associated with Thucydides (see Momigliano 1990: 45–46). Nor is it just Dionysius who is "Thucydidean." Tubero receives a parallel characterization as a truth-seeker, representative of other readers of the *De Thucydide*. He and others like him form their evaluations on the basis of the best standards; they regard truth as the most precious of all things; he and other φιλόλογοι are to evaluate whether or not Dionysius' arguments are true and proper (2). Similar statements representing Tubero as exemplary of other critically-astute readers appear at *Thuc.* 25 and 35. Dionysius assimilates his reader, Tubero (and other "Tubero-like" readers/evaluators), to the reader envisaged by Thucydides himself (1.22).

Dionysius reinforces both assimilations in the section of the *De Thucydide* specifically devoted to *ethos* (*Thuc.* 8):

μαρτυρεῖται δὲ τῷ ἀνδρὶ τάχα μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων φιλοσόφων τε καὶ ῥητόρων, εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν γε πλείστων, ὅτι καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ἧς ἱέρειαν εἶναι τὴν ἱστορίαν βουλόμεθα, πλείστην ἐποιήσατο πρόνοιαν ...

All philosophers and all rhetors (or at any rate the majority) are quick to attest that the man displayed the most forethought for Truth, whose priestess we believe History ought to be ...

The first-person plural βουλόμεθα presents a slippery ambiguity. Who are "we"? At a minimum (read exclusively), this unites Dionysius with all or most of the educated expert world. But its range may extend further, to add Thucydides himself to the group, strengthening the connection between Thucydides' critical history and Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides. Further, if βουλόμεθα is read inclusively, Tubero (and so other readers) are also part of the Thucydidean "we." The critic thus represents his own critique of Thucydides, and its further criticism by others, as "Thucydidean" projects. But since Thucydides' *ethos* is ultimately redefined as "malicious," this leaves us with a Dionysius and a Tubero who are, paradoxically, better "Thucydideans" than Thucydides himself.

Could it not be asked whether Tubero and other sophisticated readers would not have detected such tricks? The *De Thucydide* anticipates just this likelihood in its concluding words (*Thuc.* 55): τούτων ἡδίω μὲν εἶχόν σοι περὶ Θουκυδίδου γράφειν, ὦ βέλτιστε Κοΐντε Αἴλιε Τυβέρων, οὐ μὴν ἀληθέστερα ("I could have said things about Thucydides that you would have found more agreeable, my dear Quintus Aelius Tubero, but they would not have been more true"). This confirms what the opening suggests—that Tubero was a fan of Thucydides.[27] More importantly, however, it acknowledges that the result of Tubero's evaluation of the *De Thucydide* is likely to be negative. Dionysius again appropriates (in the

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[27] Tubero's style in the few surviving historical fragments is often said to be archaizing and Thucydidean in the Sallustian manner (e.g., Ogilvie 1965: 17; Bowersock 1965: 130, n. 2; doubted by Lebek [1970: 151]); for Fromentin (1998: xv–xvii; 2001: 133, n. 42) he is a leading Atticist "Thucydidean." Cf. Wiseman 1979: 112.

very last word of the treatise!) the quintessential Thucydidean virtue of truth, but with a new significance: it now refers to the truth of Dionysius' unappetizing "real" views which Tubero will perceive. Dionysius himself destroys the elaborate façade painstakingly constructed earlier in the work. This means that the *De Thucydide* is not simply Dionysius' attempt to render his ideas on Thucydides palatable to pro-Thucydideans. Rather, this is a symbolic display of acquiescence, which is acceptable even if both parties understand that it is not especially sincere. This can only be understood in terms of deference and social relations.

Although the *De Thucydide* undoubtedly reflects a historical relationship of some sort between Tubero and Dionysius, it is obviously not a private communication. Dionysius does not even offer a fiction that Tubero is the sole reader. He explicitly describes Tubero as representative of other φιλόλογοι. At the least, other Greek-literate Roman intellectuals must fall into this category, and probably Greeks as well (cf. Fornaro 1997: 4 on the *Ad Pompeium*). As it happens, we can demonstrate that the work was in the event read by a Greek audience, despite being addressed to a Roman. A later commentary on Thucydides (*P. Oxy.* 6.853) reveals a close engagement of at least one later Greek scholar with Dionysius (see Grenfell and Hunt 1908: 107–109).

But Dionysius' dependence on Roman aristocratic goodwill means that we must remain alert to the Roman context. It is generally accepted that there was a vogue for Thucydides in the second half of the first century B.C., in contrast with the earlier hellenistic period, where (although not utterly neglected) Thucydides had been of less importance than, for instance, Herodotus.[28] Our evidence is too limited to establish that this Thucydidean revival originated as a Roman phenomenon. However, it is certainly in Italy in the age of Cicero that it first comes to our notice.[29] There is no evidence for antecedents anywhere else.

In any case, whether or not a fashionable interest in Thucydides in Cicero's day was a specifically Roman or rather a pan-Mediterranean phenomenon (not that the latter would be something that could be neatly separated from Roman elite concerns), enthusiasm for Thucydides apparently reached a new pitch in the Rome to which Dionysius came in 30 B.C. Roman attitudes to Thucydides cannot be isolated from the *imitatio* and *aemulatio* of Thucydides in Latin literature. For Dionysius or any Greek, this could be treacherous ground. Roman responses to Dionysius' "own" Greek authors must sometimes have been hard to anticipate, bound up as such responses were with the sophisticated use of Greek models in a foreign literary idiom.

Aemulatio of Thucydides was a salient feature of the Latin literary scene that greeted Dionysius upon his arrival in 30 B.C. The most prominent Roman

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[28] On Thucydides' hellenistic and republican influence, see Strebel 1935: 21–35; Hornblower 1995: 58–68; for Herodotus, see Murray 1972.

[29] Cic. *Brut.* 287–288, *Orat.* 30–32, *Opt. gen.* 15–16; perhaps also Phld. *Rhet.* 1, p. 151 Sudhaus col. 7 lines 20–22 (if the restoration is correct); see esp. Leeman 1963: 159–165.

historian of the previous decade had been Thucydides' obsessive imitator Sallust.[30]
Sallust, like Virgil, was an instant classic. Octavian could assume that Antony
knew Sallust's stylistic idiosyncrasies (Suet. *Aug.* 86.3).[31] His jibe linked Sallust
with contemporary archaizers: Annius Cimber (*pr.* 44) and the more obscure
Veranius Flaccus.[32] L. Arruntius (*cos.* 22), who served under Sextus Pompeius
and later, in the 30s B.C., under Octavian, at some point wrote a history modelled
on Sallust—maniacally so (Sen. *Ep.* 114.17–19).[33] Sallust's popularity continued
among Dionysius' Augustan contemporaries (see Lebek 1970: 336–339). The
educator Arellius Fuscus was an admirer (Sen. *Controv.* 9.1.13–4). Cassius Severus
called Sallust a genius (*magna ingenia*) equal in his genre to Cicero and Virgil in
theirs (Sen. *Controv.* 3, pr. 8). Sallust was the competitor that Livy feared in the
contest for fame as a historian (Sen. *Controv.* 9.1.14). By the time of Velleius
Paterculus (2.36), Sallust was recognized as the Roman Thucydides.

This popularity means that Sallust is a valuable indicator of the particular
Roman sensitivities to which Dionysius offered a challenge. For the question
inevitably arises of why this Thucydidean vogue occurred. What did the Romans
get out of Thucydides?[34] Sallust can suggest some ways to make up for the
deficiencies of Cicero, otherwise our main source for the Atticist *Thucydidii*, who
is so focused on excluding Thucydides as a model for (especially forensic) oratory
that he largely ignores the question of Thucydides' appeal as a historian.

One possibility is that Thucydides may have interested Romans of the period as
an analyst of *stasis* (so Syme 1964: 52). Sallust supports this natural observation: the
single most imitated passage from Thucydides in Sallust's works is the digression
on *stasis* at 3.82–85.[35] Dionysius subjects this same digression (presumably beloved
by Sallust and his admirers) to extensive criticism (*Thuc.* 29–33), precisely on the
grounds that it is exemplary of defective passages in Thucydides which are widely
admired (*Thuc.* 28).

The problems which Luraghi has identified as facing Dionysius the historian
of early Rome here also affect Dionysius the critic of Thucydides. The Romans'
understanding of *stasis* and their preference for a critical stance towards the

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[30] For Sallust's *imitatio* of Thucydides, see, in general, Patzer 1941; Perrochat 1949: 1–39; Scanlon
1980.

[31] See Leisner-Jensen 1997: 345, n. 49.

[32] Annius was apparently a rhetor (*Catalepton* 2) who also had a political career; he may have taught
Greek rather than Latin: see Rawson 1985: 79. Dionysius is therefore likely to have been aware of
him. For Veranius, see, in general, Lebek 1970: 153–175, esp. 168–169 and 171–172.

[33] See Syme 1964: 291–292; Lebek 1970: 169–170.

[34] Rawson (1985: 222; cf. Hornblower 1995: 68 and n. 68) draws attention to Cic. *Orat.* 120:
*cognoscat etiam rerum gestarum et memoriae veteris ordinem, maxime scilicet nostrae civitatis sed etiam
imperiosorum populorum et regum illustrium* ("He should also know the chronological order of historical
events and of ancient memory, especially, of course, of our state, but also of dominant peoples and
distinguished kings"). Cf. Sallust's contrast between Rome's greatest imperial extent and moral decline
(*Hist.* fr. 11 Maurenbrecher).

[35] See Perrochat 1949: 15–16; Syme 1964: 246; Scanlon 1980: *passim*, esp. 55.

present were intimately connected to a narrative of decline from an idealized past. The causes of moral decline were debated—but the fact of moral decline was not really subject to question.[36] Insofar as the Romans found Thucydides useful for conceptualizing this master narrative, an inappropriate attitude towards Thucydides would inevitably have cast doubt upon Dionysius' capacity to write a properly authoritative history of early Rome.

Two elements in the rhetorical strategy adopted by Dionysius in the *De Thucydide* address this concern. Firstly, one of the earliest places in which Dionysius is prepared to criticize Thucydides' *ethos* openly is when discussing the Archaeology. This (the equivalent of conventionally idealized narratives of early Rome) offers a chink in the armor of Roman Thucydideanism. While Sallust, for instance, adopts the same critical attitude towards contemporary Rome that Thucydides displays towards contemporary Athens, he does not follow Thucydides in denigrating his early forebears. Instead he makes his account conform to the master narrative's idealization of the early Roman past (*Cat.* 5.9–9.5; cf. *Cat.* 53.2–4, *Iug.* 4.5–6 and 41.2, and *Hist.* fr. 11 Maurenbrecher). Dionysius' attack on Thucydides' treatment of early Greece draws attention to Thucydides' imperfect suitability as a model for Roman histories, and signals that Dionysius would produce a more suitable early Roman history than a strict "Thucydidean."

This also covertly advances the Aeolist agenda of the *Antiquitates Romanae*. Sallust's laudatory digression on early Rome in the *Bellum Catilinae* (5.9–13.5) corresponds structurally with the Archaeology in Thucydides.[37] This reinforces by contrast Sallust's claim that the splendors of the Greek (in particular the Athenian) past have been exaggerated in comparison to the achievements of an early Rome deficient in historians to memorialize its glories (*Cat.* 8). This suggests that Sallust, and presumably other Romans, read the Archaeology as reinforcing the master narrative of Roman history, by indicating that early Roman virtues were uniquely Roman. This is an idea that Dionysius has to kill. Since the early Romans were in fact Greeks, their past glories were one part of the broader glories of the Greek past (see Luraghi 2003: 277–281).

More generally, Sallust's imitation of Thucydides' critical attitude towards contemporary Athens (not to mention the masochism with which contemporary Romans embraced Sallust's criticisms) is relevant to the sensitivity which Dionysius displays when discussing Thucydides' "unpatriotic" *ethos* in the *De Thucydide* (and Sallust was of course only a recent manifestation of a strain in Roman historiography going back to the Elder Cato). One particular element in Dionysius' feigned modification of his views on Thucydides' *ethos* seems especially to correspond to Sallust's own Thucydidean self-presentation (and interestingly enough, on a point where Sallust departs from Cato, his other main model). Dionysius supports his new claim for Thucydides' impartiality by referring to

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[36] See Lintott 1972: 626–629; Lintott 1994: 6–10; Wallace-Hadrill 1997: 6–11.

[37] See Patzer 1941: 128; Kraus and Woodman 1997: 16–17.

positive portrayals of individual Athenian leaders. Sallust, against a background of general criticism of Roman morals, singles out individual Roman leaders for praise. The most forceful example is the *synkrisis* of Caesar and Cato in the *Bellum Catilinae* (*Cat*. 53–54). One function that Sallust's evenhanded praise of both Caesar and Cato serves is to reinforce his conventional historian's stance of impartiality (*Cat*. 4.2; cf. *Hist*. fr. 6 Maurenbrecher) by positioning him outside and above the partisan debate that manifested itself in competing works making arguments for one or the other.[38]

Criticizing Thucydides for criticizing his compatriots might simply be taken as impertinent by Romans accustomed to censorious Sallustian historiography. More importantly, here too Dionysius was in danger of compromising in the eyes of Romans his capacity to write Roman history. Dionysius the rhetorician's views on Thucydides' *ethos* would inevitably affect the *ethos* of Dionysius the historian. His appropriation of Thucydides' *ethos* for himself in the *De Thucydide* likely displays sensivity to this risk.

A particular detail worth noticing is Dionysius' denial that the flaws in the *De imitatione* resulted from ὀλιγωρίαν καὶ ῥᾳστώνην ("contempt and carelessness," *Thuc*. 1); instead, they are due to the summary nature of the discussion in the *De imitatione*. Transposed into historiography, the first two correspond to the conventional assertions of impartiality and diligence (or more specifically to disclaimers of the opposite vices).[39] The third represents Dionysius' errors as arising from an overenthusiastic application of brevity—a quality closely associated with Thucydides (and his Roman *aemulus* Sallust) and one which Dionysius himself claims is responsible for Thucydides' lack of clarity.[40] Dionysius' defense as a rhetor here seems shaped with an eye to its implications for his own *ethos* as a historian.

Luraghi's arguments about the *Antiquitates Romanae* are relevant here. Insofar as deficiencies in authority as a Roman historian drive Dionysius there to present himself as a Greek historian writing for Greeks, they also drive him to rely upon an authoritative *ethos* as a historian in general and more specifically as a Greek historian writing in the tradition of his predecessors. Displaying the appropriate relationship to significant earlier Greek historians becomes crucial. So far everything can be adequately explained in Luraghi's terms, as reflecting the deficient authority of a Greek writing a history of Rome. We are not compelled to consider Dionysius' more general dependence on the Roman elite. (Neither are we compelled to ignore it.)

That broader dependence is crucially relevant in another respect. An interest in *stasis* is one likely reason for Roman interest in Thucydides and Thucydides' critical *ethos*. Another is indicated by recent scholars who have emphasized the

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[38] On Sallust's refusal to choose explicitly between Caesar and Cato, see esp. Batstone 1988: 4–5.

[39] See Marincola 1997: 148–174; on impartiality, see also Herkommer 1968: 139–144 and Luce 1989.

[40] *Thuc*. 24, 32, 53; cf. *Pomp*. 3.17; for Sallust's brevity, see Sen. *Ep*. 114.17 and Quint. 4.2.5.

advantages conferred on the Roman aristocracy by its embrace of Greek literary culture. A literate education in the Greek manner was almost exclusively an elite possession. It could help to legitimize the superior position of the few Romans with access to such education.[41]

Not all Greek authors, either in themselves or as models for Latin literature, would be equally suitable for this exclusionary purpose. One would expect a preference for stylistically difficult, even obscurantist authors such as Thucydides.[42] Preferred texts might also advertise that they were directed towards an exclusive class of unusually intelligent readers or would focus on war and politics, the preoccupations of the aristocracy. Again, Thucydides might appeal.[43]

The stylistic difficulty of Thucydides' imitator Sallust must be seen in this light. It implicitly positions Sallust as speaking, "like Thucydides," only to a select educated audience.[44] This partially explains his popularity among his peers despite his savage attacks on their morals: such criticisms were couched in a style that signaled that they were being kept within the group. There were alternatives. Historiography could be aimed at "people in very humble circumstances who could not expect to manage public affairs, even craftsmen" (*homines infima fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique*, Cic. *Fin*. 5.52).[45] Nepos' biographies were aimed at an audience with limited knowledge of Greek literature.

We can detect signs of Dionysius responding to these particular concerns in the *De Thucydide*. He repudiates his earlier criticism of Thucydides' failure to enliven the narrative with digressions. He now praises Thucydides precisely for disdaining to entice οἱ πολλοί with fabulous material (a nicely political take on Thuc. 1.22) and preferring instead an austere narrative geared to a single war.

There is also a striking passage where Dionysius discusses the politics of stylistic accessibility. First, the view which he opposes (*Thuc*. 50):

[41] See Morgan 1998: 226–273 (esp. for the relationship between the "partially" educated few and the "fully" educated very few); also Habinek 1998: 34–68 (for Roman elite literary culture more generally); Whitmarsh 2001: 14–15 (for Roman elite appropriation of Greek *paideia* in particular).

[42] Cicero in later works associates Thucydides with stylistic *gravitas* and the closely-allied *granditas* (*Brut*. 29, 287, *Orat*. 30–32). Moral *gravitas* is an aristocratic quality, in tension with the subjection of politicians to popular power (e.g., Cic. *Planc*. 50): see Hellegouarc'h 1972: 279–294, esp. 292. Cicero does not mention *gravitas* when discussing Thucydides' style at *De or*. 2.56 and 92, which suggests a possible connection with the Atticist debate of the 40s B.C.

[43] For Cicero, Thucydides is the war-historian *par excellence* (*Orat*. 30–31): *Thucydides autem res gestas et bella narrat et proelia, graviter sane et probe . . . rerum explicator prudens, severus, gravis . . . ut in historiis bella narraret* ("Thucydides, however, gives accounts of history, wars, and battles, with dignity indeed, and correctness, . . . a wise, austere, and dignified narrator of events . . . with the aim of giving historical accounts of wars"; *Orat*. 39: *alter* [Thucydides] *incitatior fertur et de bellicis rebus canit etiam quodam modo bellicum* ("The second historian [Thucydides] moves at a faster pace, and, in connection with the events of war, even sounds a sort of war-trumpet").

[44] Cf. Quint. 4.2.5 on Sallustian obscurity's demand for a *lector eruditus* in a (typically aristocratic) state of *otium*; see Heldmann 1993: 3–9.

[45] See Wiseman 1981: 383–387; Schultze 1986: 134–135.

ἐπιχειροῦσι δέ τινες οὐκ ἄδοξοι σοφισταὶ λέγειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πρὸς τὰς ὀχλικὰς
ἐντεύξεις παρεσκευασμένοις καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγουσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιτήδειος οὗτος ὁ
χαρακτήρ, τοῖς δὲ τὰς ἱστορικὰς πραγματείας ἐκφέρουσιν, αἷς μεγαλοπρεπείας τε δεῖ
καὶ σεμνολογίας καὶ καταπλήξεως, παντὸς μάλιστα προσήκει ταύτην ἀσκεῖν τὴν
φράσιν τὴν γλωττηματικήν τε καὶ ἀπηρχαιωμένην καὶ τροπικὴν καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένην
τῶν ἐν ἔθει σχημάτων ἐπὶ τὸ ξένον καὶ περιττόν. οὐ γὰρ ἀγοραίοις ἀνθρώποις οὐδ'
ἐπιδιφρίοις ἢ χειροτέχναις οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἳ μὴ μετέσχον ἀγωγῆς ἐλευθερίου ταύτας
κατασκευάζεσθαι τὰς γραφάς, ἀλλ' ἀνδράσι διὰ τὴν ἐγκυκλίων μαθημάτων ἐπὶ
ῥητορικήν τε <καὶ> φιλοσοφίαν ἐληλυθόσιν, οἷς οὐδὲν φανήσεται τούτων ξένον.

But some quite distinguished experts try to assert that, although this style is not well-suited
to those preparing themselves for addressing the mob or forensic oratory, for those who are
publishing historical works (which have to possess suitable grandeur, dignity of expression,
and a striking quality), it is a style pre-eminently suitable to develop: unusual, archaic, and
figurative in language, and deviating from figures in everyday use towards what is strange
and beyond the norm. For, they argue, these literary works are not composed for the
people in the marketplace, nor for shopkeepers or artisans, nor anyone else who has not
received his share of a gentlemanly education (ἀγωγῆς ἐλευθερίου), but instead for men
who have gone through the usual studies (ἐγκυκλίων μαθημάτων) and come to rhetoric
and philosophy. To these men nothing of the above will seem strange.

This defense of Thucydides' obscurity corresponds to the view of Thucydides
that I have argued made him attractive to the Roman aristocracy. Firstly, note
the positive evaluation of Thucydides in explicit social terms as an exemplar
of a historiography whose readership does not extend to the great unwashed.
Secondly, note the anachronistic reinvention of Thuc. 1.22 as referring to a
readership educated in the *enkyklios paideia*, a concept that did not yet exist in
Thucydides' day but was highly important in the Roman period (see Morgan
1998: 33–39). The adherents of this view therefore argued in favor of Thucydides'
style as accessible to a readership that was educated in rhetoric and philosophy,
but not radically beyond the aristocratic norm. They saw a broad educated elite as
the ideal target audience.

Leeman (1963: 180–181) has argued for attributing these ideas to Caecilius
of Caleacte and connected them with Sallust. Whatever the facts of that may
be, this is a key passage for the reception of Thucydides in the first century B.C.,
including his reception as a model for Latin literature. Dionysius' argument for
the prosecution deserves close consideration (*Thuc.* 51):[46]

πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς οἰομένους μόνων εἶναι τὴν εὐπαιδεύτων ἀναγνῶναί τε καὶ συνεῖναι
τὴν Θουκυδίδου διάλεκτον ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχω, ὅτι τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκαῖόν τε καὶ
χρήσιμον ἅπασιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἂν> ἀναγκαιότερον γένοιτο οὐδὲ πολυωφελέστερον)
ἀναιροῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου, ὀλίγων παντάπασιν ἀνθρώπων οὕτω ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ
ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις ἢ τυραννουμέναις πόλεσιν· εὐαρίθμητοι γάρ τινές εἰσιν οἷοι
πάντα τὰ Θουκυδίδου συμβαλεῖν, καὶ οὐδ' οὗτοι χωρὶς ἐξηγήσεως γραμματικῆς ἔνια.

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[46] On this passage, see Schultze 1986: 135–136; cf. Fromentin 1998: xvi–xvii; 2001: 133–134.

I can answer those who think that it is the educated alone who can read and understand Thucydides' language as follows: that they are taking away from common, everyday life (τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου) the part of the work that is both necessary and useful to everyone (for there could be nothing more necessary or more useful in various ways) when they make it the exclusive property of a few people in this way—just like in oligarchic or tyrannical states. For it is easy to count the number of those able to understand all of Thucydides, and even these cannot understand some parts without using a grammatical commentary.

He explicitly draws out the political assumptions of the argument of his opponents, and recasts them in an illegitimate form as appropriate to oligarchy and tyranny. He then characterizes Thucydides' challenging style in extreme (and probably exaggerated) terms: very few can understand all of Thucydides, and even then only with a commentary. This presents a flattering picture of Dionysius' proficiency in his professional capacity as rhetor, for he has displayed his ability to read and rewrite Thucydides throughout the work. More importantly, he denies that a thorough but normal education is enough to render Thucydides accessible. This implies that Thucydides is not suitable for legitimization of the position of the "normal" Roman aristocrat as one of the educated. Strikingly, despite his protestations that history is beneficial (another appropriation of a key Thucydidean idea) to more than just a select group, Dionysius does not actually attack the idea that a historian accessible primarily to the educated would be a good historian; he instead represents Thucydides as so extreme in his inaccessibility that he cannot fit the desired model. In response to the concrete social reality conjured up by the references to humble occupations and the totally uneducated in the previous passage, Dionysius can only speak vaguely of history relevant to τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου.

Dionysius, then, goes beyond modifying his stance to strengthen his tricky position as a Greek historian of the early Roman past. He is also cautious when engaging with more general aspects of Roman elite reception of Thucydides. When Dionysius moves away from areas directly relevant to his *ethos* as a Roman historian, he becomes a little bolder in challenging his opponents. Certainly, he endorses the idea of a historiography directed at more than a very select group (although exactly how broad a group it should instead be directed to is a question he leaves carefully unanswered). This greater boldness may be an indicator that Dionysius the Greek rhetor enjoyed greater authority than Dionysius the Roman historian. But his continued caution suggests that he is still constrained in what he can say even when evaluating "his" Greek literature.

In this context, what are we to make of the statement at the end of the *De Thucydide*, acknowledging the likely failure of Dionysius' rhetorical strategy and professing (paradoxically) truthfulness? This statement offers two separate compliments to Tubero. Firstly, Dionysius' earlier "change of heart" is rendered a purely symbolic display of deference to Tubero's superior social position. In its way, this is a greater tribute to Tubero's importance than a "genuine" intellectual conversion. Secondly, and more significantly, Dionysius here implies that Tubero

is too penetrating a reader to fall for the Greek's rhetorical tricks. The Roman aristocracy, as I have argued, admired and emulated Thucydides' history as a text directed exclusively to such rhetorically sophisticated and highly educated readers.

As we have seen, Dionysius on the one hand assimilates Tubero to such a sophisticated "Thucydidean" reader. On the other hand, he appropriates one aspect of Thucydides' *ethos* for his own: truthfulness. The *De Thucydide* thus provides a display of *mimesis* of Thucydides, a *mimesis* characteristic of Dionysius in being a discriminating process of adopting the best in the model and discarding the rest.[47]

This *mimesis* sends different signals to different elements of Dionysius' Greek-literate (but not entirely Greek) readership. Greek-literate Romans are presumably encouraged to identify with Tubero as sophisticated "Thucydideans," able to appreciate Dionysius' rhetorical subtlety without being deceived by it, and to see in this reinforcement of their social position. Such claims are also reinforced in a less overt way. The Roman elite controlled limited resources needed by immigrant intellectuals like Dionysius, but to Romans such Greek educators were themselves a limited resource, access to which was one distinguishing mark of the educated Roman aristocracy. Such experts therefore had to be "special"—to retain something of their alien Greekness. Greek scholars who accommodated themselves entirely to the Roman elite's perspective towards Greek literature would have nothing distinctive to add and would become worthless. Dionysius' display of temporary and counterfeit accommodation suits this nicely. It signals both deference to Roman opinion and a continuing assertion of Greek idiosyncrasy (which is, however, at the disposal of Romans, seeing as the treatise advertises that it was written at Tubero's request).

To other Greeks—especially other expatriates in Rome—it is perhaps Dionysius' agile balance between these two competing challenges of acquiescence and assertion that sends a message. Dionysius advertises his mastery of how to respond to the complex demands imposed on the Greek scholar working in the strange Roman world, especially the need to acquire and cultivate useful ties to the Roman aristocracy. Dionysius indicates in his opening that it was problems with the *De imitatione* that led Tubero to request the composition of the *De Thucydide*. This draws attention to the learning process that Dionysius has undergone. Whatever the situation at the outset of his career, Dionysius now knows how to work the system.

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[47] For Dionysius' conception of *mimesis*, see Hidber 1996: 56–75; Battisti 1997: 16–17; Whitmarsh 2001: 71–75.

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